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In this paper I seek to address a series of themes surrounding Luther’s
view of agency and action in “Treatise on Good Works.” In Section I,
I begin with a statement on what I think Luther intended to say. This
is followed by an interpretation of the main theme of the “Treatise,”
viz., faith and works, (Section II). The next step is to trace some of the
implications of this main theme including Luther’s view of agency
and action as stated in the theological context of the treatise (Section
III), a specific application of Luther’s view to current ethical method
and (Section IV), to introduce a current interpretation of Luther’s view
of passivity, action and agency (Section V). In doing the latter I was
quite surprised and very delighted to discover Eberhard Jungel, and
have used some aspects of his views as a gloss on Luther’s views.
I. The Shape of the Treatise on Good Works.
Martin Luther was no moral theologian schooled in the nuances of
ethical methodology. He was a professor of biblical exegesis. Yet if
one approaches the Reformation leaders in terms of their impact on
Christian living, then Luther turns out to be by far the more
interesting and controversial figure. No where is this more apparent
than in the “Treatise on Good Works” where use of the phrase “good
works” covers a multitude of moral endeavors, all of which
presuppose the centrality of human action and agency.1 From the very
beginning Luther aims to identify a specifically Christian use of the
term “good works” which requires that we “watch carefully” for there
are many aberrant uses found in certain practices of “trickery and
deception” which inevitably mislead us into false and erroneous
beliefs.2 Hence, much of the “Treatise” is given over to exposing the
difficulties with such beliefs. For example, one such difficulty is the
notion that there is a relation of consequence between good works
and acceptance by God, or a reversal in the proper way that faith and
works are ordered. Luther offers a more definitive statement of aim
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in the 1535 Lectures on Galatians where he describes a theological
grammar of “doing”:
Therefore we have to rise higher in theology with the word “doing,”
so that it becomes altogether new. For just as it becomes something
different when it is taken from the natural area into the moral, so it
becomes something much more different when it is transferred from
philosophy and from the Law into theology. Thus it has a completely
new meaning; it does indeed require right reason and a good will, but
in a theological sense, not in a moral sense, which means that
through the Word of the Gospel I know and believe that God sent His
Son into the world to redeem us from sin and death.... Therefore
“doing” is always understood in theology as doing with faith, so that
doing with faith is another sphere and a new realm, so to speak, one
that is different from moral doing. When we theologians speak about
“doing,” therefore, it is necessary that we speak about doing with
faith, because in theology we have no right reason and good will
except faith.3
This sense of “doing with faith,” different from moral doing will,
I believe, provide us with a helpful perspective on Luther’s view of
faith and good works. He calls this a “theological sense
of doing which is new at least in the way it defines “good works” as
something beyond the agent’s projects or undertakings. Luther
writes:
The first thing to know is that there are no good works except those
works God has commanded, just as there is no sin except that which
God has forbidden.... Accordingly, we have to learn to recognize
good works from the commandments of God, and not from the
appearance, size, or number of the works themselves, nor from the
opinion of men or of human law or custom, as we see has happened
and still happens because of our blindness and disregard of the divine
commandments.4
Good works is a specifically theological matter for Luther
because of its orientation to the commands of God and preeminently
the first commandment. In fact, the whole “Treatise on Good Works”
can be viewed as a revisionist proposal to rework our language about
good works by recalling it to a proper theological use in relation to
God’s commands, so that discourse about human action be oriented
to the language of divine command. “Orientation” is not used here to
imply a heteronomy in the sense that a separate divine will is imposed
on the human agent in the same constricted way that legal laws
112 Consensus
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006
determine human action: the Decalogue is not law in this sense.
Rather it is law understood as precepts, instruction or teaching
(doctrina).5 It seems evident from the character of Luther’s
exposition that he has in mind faithful persons in Christian
community and his explanation of the Decalogue is shaped in
discourse which is pastoral in that it has practical significance for a
Christian’s life of faith, prayer and worship. Counsels directed to the
life of personal faith yield a different understanding of the character
of good works because they emerge from a context of personal
appropriation – one that is implicit within the individual’s focus upon
a divine personal reality which, even though separate, is powerfully
evocative and enabling of human agency. This relational context,
presumably, is the source from which we come to understand that “of
all things good works should have a single, simple goodness” without
which they are just color, glitter and deceit.6
Now this in turn leads Luther to a particular and unique account
of the foundation and status of human action, which is found
frequently throughout the “Treatise on Good Works.” In commenting
on the spiritual rest taught in the Sabbath command, Luther notes “…
that we not only cease from our labor and trade but much more – that
we let God alone work in us and that in all our powers do we do
nothing of our own.”7 Clearly, human actions do not determine or
define the agent who is to cease from his own works allowing God
alone to work within and this orientation of good human action is
sharply distinguished from the orientation to self that is characteristic
of the busy worker for merit. Indeed, a greater part of “Treatise on
Good Works” is very like an instructional manual for growing into
good human actions, which are intimately connected with the agent’s
trustful submission to the action of God. We may note the respective
roles of human and divine action implied here by attending to what
Luther considers the most definitive feature of Christian life: “The
first, highest, and most precious of all good works is faith in Christ,
and as it says in John 6 [: 28-29] … For in this work all good works
exist, and from faith these works receive a borrowed goodness. We
must make this absolutely clear, so that men can understand it.”8
II. The Central Point: Faith and Works
The theme of the “Treatise on Good Works” is the relation of faith
and works and Luther reiterates the central affirmation that faith is at
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the center of good works. In contrast to those who have made faith
into a kind of work, a virtue of its own separated from other virtues,
Luther claims that “… faith alone makes all other works good,
acceptable, and worthy because it trusts God and never doubts that
everything a man does in faith is well done in God’s sight.”9 In
remarking on the prohibition against false witness he states that in
this commandment “… faith must be the foreman behind this work.
Without faith no one is able to do this work. In fact, all works are
entirely comprised in faith, as I have often said, therefore apart from
faith all works are dead, no matter how wonderful they look or what
splendid names they have.”10
What is meant by “works are entirely comprised in faith?” Luther
surely means something more than a use of “faith” to simply name an
ancillary condition for the acceptance of good works, works which
could in principle be performed apart from faith but only acceptable
when performed in faith. The phrase, “comprised in faith,” hardly
describes a relation which is ancillary or external; rather, it alludes to
a relation of internal containment very like the case where Luther
speaks of works being acceptable not for their own sake “… but
because of faith, which is always the same and lives and works in
each and every work without distinction.”11 A more accurate
description of the relation is found in the phrase, “Faith lives in
works, just as works are done in faith.”12 The relation is not one in
which faith is reduced to a motivational impulse in the agent
sustaining what is morally good; nor is it an extra saving power added
to good works. It is a relation in which faith incorporates itself into
the goodness of the work even providing works with the capacity to
be good. Hence, Luther speaks of works “entirely comprised in faith”
in the sense that faith is a part of the constitution of the goodness of
the good work, it is internal to the definition of good works.13 The
relation is one in which it is in order to conceive of faith being
realized in works or as, Althaus puts it, “‘Works’ are nothing but the
concrete realization of faith itself.” He states: 
Faith needs works – that is, concrete specific aspects of life – in order
to be itself at any point. Faith always needs secular life – just as
secular life in turn always needs faith. Believing is not something I
do alongside my life in this world but rather in it – in each and every
act of living. Faith expresses itself in the form of works. Faith lives
in works, just as works are done in faith.14
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This view precludes certain other ways of designating the
relation of faith and works. For example, faith and good works are
not related externally, which is to say that they are not in a causal or
instrumental relation; faith neither causes good works nor are good
words a means to end e.g., to earn merit. We do say that faith and
good works are connected internally where it is meant that faith lives
in works and so is a constituent in the goodness of the good work, that
is, we mean that faith is contained within the goodness of the work.
This in turn invites a change in the way we conceptualize good works
as a means of achieving something for to say that the connection is
internal and conceptual is to invite one to envisage that the very
possibility of good works themselves are the gift of faith. So there is
no issue of bridging some gap or relation between faith and good
works for there is no gap. Rather, we are invited to a faith which
informs one’s very conception of a good human endeavor; it is a
reorientation or re-perception of one’s entire attitude to works
whereby faith as confident trust from the heart sees all works as
gracious gifts pleasing to God. To see this is gift. 
The view that faith is internal to the concept of good works is
parallel to the claim that faith is directional: it has focus or orientation
to God’s action which alone makes good works possible; there are no
good works except those which God has commanded and we will
always need, according to Luther, to learn to recognize good works
from the commandments of God. So the faith which is contained
within the concept of good works is directional in the sense that it is
oriented to the actions of God identified in the commands of the
Decalogue which, on Luther’s understanding, is to say that “… this
faith, this trust, this confidence from the heart’s core is the true
fulfilling of the first commandment.”15 One writer rightly notes,
“Like Aquinas, Luther thinks that the first commandment is the key
to all the others because ‘if the heart is in a right relationship with
God and this commandment is kept, then all the other
commandments will follow of themselves.’ The first commandment
‘illumines’ all the others and shares its splendor with them.”16 In sum,
the correlation of faith and God’s action in the exclusive demand of
the first command is what leads Luther to say that “… God has
promised his grace freely, and he wills that we start by trusting that
grace and perform all works in that grace, whatever those works may
be.”17
Doing With Faith 115
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol31/iss2/9
III. Luther on Agency and Action
How does the primacy of faith influence Christian life? Clearly, the
emphasis is on the passivity of the moral agent and Luther sets forth
the implications of this view. At one level, persons are inevitably
involved in action: “Now since the being and nature of man cannot
exist for an instant unless it is doing or not doing something, putting
up with or running away from something (for as we know, life never
stands still), well then, let him who wants to be whole and full of
good works begin to exercise himself at all times in this faith in all
his life and works.”18 But Luther is not inferring that such works are
being done in a way to merit grace or favor nor is such activity a form
of self-actualization. The actualization of the self is not primary to
Luther and good works, even understood as “religious works,” are
those in which “to all appearances God is honored, but in reality the
self has been set up as an idol.”19 One writer properly describes these
as mere acts of appeasement and self-righteousness, which exhibit
the depths of a self-corruption which turns all goods to itself.20 The
focus of Luther’s criticism here is directed to those who calculate
benefits accumulating to oneself on the basis of certain kind of moral
performances and such action undertaken for self-benefit expose the
Christian’s self-orientation to, his/her works – it is a disease of the
self which is the curse of sin. 
Good works grounded in faith, however, function as a release for
the joyful and confident act of thanksgiving to God and service of the
neighbour. So, in the exposition of the third commandment Luther
emphasizes that true worship precludes actions aimed to appease
wrath or secure favor; it is action evoked by the sheer goodness of the
object being praised. This is why the third commandment amplifies
the first for “… this commandment like the second, should be nothing
other than a doing and a keeping of the first commandment, that is,
of faith, trust, confidence, hope and love toward God so that in all the
commandments the first may be the captain, and faith the chief work
and life of all other works, without which ... such works cannot be
good.”21 In interpreting the commands of the second table, Luther
clarifies that the duty to one’s neighbor is founded in the way faith
releases the agent from self-concerns to a cheerful trust in God’s
goodness. Likewise, the commandment against murder is also rooted
in faith: “… if faith does not doubt the favor of God, and a man has
no doubt that he has a gracious God, it will be quite easy for him to
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be gracious and favorable to his neighbor, however much the
neighbor may have sinned against him.”22
These are some of the many examples indicating how faith, as
trustful response to the priority and beneficence of God’s actions,
effects the release of the moral agent from self-concerns. But faith
also contributes to a proper confidence characterizing good works. At
the beginning of the “Treatise” Luther says unequivocally that the
first and most precious of all good works is faith in Christ. He then
refers to those involved in good works who doubt or do not know
whether what they do pleases God and remarks “… that is not faith,
nor is it a good conscience toward God; therefore their works are
pointless.”23 Having faith in Christ, however, means that in doing the
works that I do I am assured that they are acceptable and pleasing to
God and, according to Baylor, this is because faith confers on the
conscience the ability to judge persons before acts and acts in the
light of persons.24 Here Luther’s point is that faith generates an
assurance which amounts to a confidence which in turn tests the
goodness of an action: “If he finds his heart confident that it pleases
God, then the work is good.”25 So, faith as trust in God’s action frees
us from self centered action and the accusations of conscience to an
unrestrained confidence: “A Christian man who lives in this
confidence toward God knows all things, can do all things, ventures
everything that needs to be done, and does everything gladly and
willingly, not that he may gather merits and good works, but because
it is a pleasure for him to please God in doing these things.”26
Two other key themes bear on human action: first, Luther
challenges the distinction between “secular” and “religious” works.
“In … faith all works become equal, and one work is like the other;
all distinctions between works fall away, whether they be great,
small, short, long, many, or few. For the works are acceptable not for
their own sake but because of faith, which is always the same and
lives and works in each and every work without distinction.” This
egalitarian faith makes complex instructions in good works
unnecessary, for a “Christian man living in this faith has no need of a
teacher of good works.”27 Since faith is comprised in good works,
and since good works are free acts of praise rather than grounds for
acceptance or merit, then the correct performance of religious works
has little significance. Luther’s case is not simply against religious
triviality but against an aberrational understanding of Christian
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action. For good works are either directed to God in praise or directed
to others in service. Preoccupation with religious techniques is likely
another form of absorption in the agent’s self-interest. 
Second, Luther has much to say about works and neighbors. In
commending selflessness in his interpretation of the seventh
commandment, Luther states: “Faith teaches this work of itself. If the
heart expects and puts its trust in divine favor, how can a man be
greedy and anxious? Such a man is absolutely certain that he is
acceptable to God therefore he does not cling to money; he uses his
money cheerfully for the benefit of his neighbor.”28 Because faith
releases an agent to act for the well being of the neighbor, a Christian
ethos is characterized by the prevalence of good action towards one’s
neighbors in freedom from self-interest; the real need is to have self-
concern suspended in order that an agent have as much devotion as
she ought to human activity for the benefit of her neighbor. “The
distinction is between trust in works out of concern for one’s own
eternal welfare and trust in works out of concern for the needs of
another.”29 In sum, Luther’s appeal to the primacy of faith in his
discussion of action in Christian life consolidates a number key
features of his moral outlook, especially those concerned with the
primacy of divine action and the reorientation of the acting subject
and his or her conscious action in response to that primacy. The most
obvious consequence of this view is that it leads to an emphasis on
the human person as passive and only secondarily an active agent.
What does this mean for the discussion of human action? 
IV. Passivity and Ethical Action
First, Luther is clear in the “Treatise” about the passivity of faith:
“The highest and first work of God in us and the best training is that
we let our own works go and let our reason and will lie dormant,
resting and commending ourselves to God in all things, especially
when they appear spiritual and good.”30 In his discourse on the
Sabbath command Luther states that in its spiritual intention “The
spiritual rest which God especially intends in the commandment is
that we not only cease from our labor and trade but much more – that
we let God alone work in us and that in all our powers do we do
nothing of our own.”31 Luther is clear that when we rest from our
works, thoughts, and life then (as St. Paul says in Galatians 2: [20])
it is no longer we who live but Christ who lives, works, and speaks in
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us.32 To be here is to find repose in pleasing God and contentedness
in service as opposed to “… he who is not at one with God, or is in a
state of doubt, worries and starts looking about for ways and means
…” to influence God with good works.33 Clearly, the primacy of faith
shapes Luther’s moral world with emphasis upon the human person
as the passive recipient of the work of God and only secondarily as a
human agent for now “our works cease” and “God alone dwells in
us.”34
Second, what the passivity of faith means above all is that the
discussion of the acts of human agents takes place first in the
indicative and only subsequently in the imperative because the
guiding question in Luther’s view is not, “What must I do?”, but
“What has God done?”. This has an implication for beliefs about
human moral action as in the case of a theologian35 who notes that a
primary foundation of Christian life is given in the form of indicative
statements, i.e., God has done X and Y for you. The ethical
imperatives or obligations associated with Christian life take the form
Do X or Y and these are claimed to be logically based on the
indicatives or they are not Christian. Often the inference is discussed
in a more abstract way as the logical impossibility of deriving an
‘ought’ statement from a descriptive or an ‘is’ statement quite
independent of the person’s faith and action which, I submit, is not
the way Luther would construe human moral acts. For one thing, it is
the human person as agent and actor who is being formed (or
transformed) by embracing certain fundamental indicative
affirmations of the Gospel which pertain to God’s indwelling so there
is something very different packed into an indicative statement than
is determined by reference to either its grammatical form or logical
relations. For another, it is awkward and simplistic to construe
Luther’s view as one in which there is a division of the two in a way
that we can claim that indicatives do not become imperatives or that
imperatives are derived from the indicatives; rather indicatives enter
into the formation of our imperatives in the way that our faith is
internal to the definition of good works. From another perspective,
we may say that Luther’s view of persons as moral agents
incorporates at once both the descriptive and normative aspect of the
Christian life. His exposition of the Decalogue assumes that
Christians have certain normative obligations placed upon them,
which is simply to say that descriptively Christians are understood as
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persons whose faith is such that they can be relied upon to follow
certain kinds of imperatives they already embody. There is, so to
speak, a kind of “isness” to the “oughtness” in that what we ought to
do is already embodied in what in fact we are. So when Luther
addresses us in the “Treatise on Good Works” with a series of
instructions and expectations about behavior we are encountering at
one and the same time statements about what we are (justified) and
what we are expected to do. It is to recognize that good works mean
nothing unless they are a manifestation of faith, the faith that lives in
works.
V. Interpretation: Passivity, Agency and Action
If the issue around the passivity of faith is not, “What must I do?”,
but “What has God done?”, then attention to good works is inevitably
directed to “God alone” who “works in us” evoking a passive
response characterized as a “cessation” or “receiving.” But is this the
only or even the most reasonable way to characterize what Luther has
to say about the action of the agent? 
Eberhard Jungel is an interpreter of Luther who endorses
passivity of faith and believes that Luther’s view of human moral
action disputes any view that defines persons by their active self-
actualization, especially that of the philosopher Aristotle who claims
that “We become just by performing just acts.”36 On this view, being
just or righteous is a disposition of the agent who engages repeatedly
in actions. It is a view against which Luther states in unequivocal
fashion: “We do not become righteous by doing righteous deeds, but,
having been made righteous, we do righteous deeds. This in
opposition to the philosophers.”37 In a Letter to Spalatin, Luther
writes, “We are not, as Aristotle believes, made righteous by the
doing of just deeds, unless we deceive ourselves; but rather – if I may
say so – in becoming and being righteous people we do just deeds.
First it is necessary that the persons be changed, then the deeds (will
follow).”38
Luther’s assertion that we act righteously only if we become and
are righteous raises a query: How can a person become righteous
prior to that person’s deeds? The answer is not to be found in the
primacy of agency and action for it stands, according to Jungel, in
contradistinction to the primacy of God’s creative action upon the
self. This latter action construed as revelation is crucial to Jungel for
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it accomplishes a “change of being” which means that the changed
person is now only properly understood as creatio ex nihilo – created
out of nothing.39 In short, what Jungel is contending is that
justification underlines the force of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo
applied not as a mode of creation but as redemption from sin making
it definitively clear that to be justified is to be acted upon, to be a
receiver. The action here is divine revelation, the divine “Word of
address”40 in which the human person is interrupted in a crisis which
disrupts self-identity and self-possession in such a way that one is
released from domination by works/action and freed to become
authentically human. As such, the human person is “defined” by the
Word as a hearer distinguished from action in a way that liberates
from the compulsion to act and hence becomes free. Jungel supports
the implied distinction between person and works by appeal to
Luther’s distinction between “inner” and “outer.” He states:
‘It is always necessary that the … person himself be good before
there can be any good works, and that good works follow and
proceed for the good person.’ This statement clearly identifies ‘the
person’ with the ‘inner man,’ for whom everything depends on the
fact that he does not constitute himself. Correspondingly, the person
does not constitute itself through its own deeds. The person becomes
a doer only through love. On the other hand, the person is constituted
by God’s Word and the decision between faith or unbelief which
corresponds with or contradicts that Word. But the free or unfree
person – dependent upon the decision– is expressed in its deeds. And
the medium of its deeds is the outer man.41
That a person is righteous prior to that person’s deeds becomes
intelligible with Jungel’s distinction between person (being) and
works (doing) for it is persons as beings that are the subject of
attributions such as freedom, righteousness or goodness. But it is
important not to misunderstand Jungel when he frequently speaks of
person or being as “prior to all activity” and fundamentally a
“recipient, which can give God nothing but the honor of first
receiving itself from him.” In naming this discourse about self as
“ontological,”42 Jungel is not offering an exhaustive definition of
personhood so much as recommending a manner of evaluating
human worth, which is not oriented to agency and action. Whatever
else the faith that justifies does in the “Treatise on Good Works,” it
posits persons without or in spite of works and in doing so entails a
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distinction between the truth of personhood and the actuality of
works. The implied thrust of Luther’s treatise is radical when seen as
a reversal of normalcy: being precedes doing.
Jungel captures some the meaning implicit in Luther’s theme of
the primacy and passivity of faith found in the “Treatise” and
forcefully reminds us that our personhood is not embodied in our
action, yet there is room to ask how the passivity of faith involves
human action – action which is more than a receptivity bordering on
passive acquiescence. Luther himself is not without a view about this
matter when he states, “that our works cease and that God alone
works in us, is accomplished in two ways.”43 The first way has to do
with our own effort; the second way, through the effort or urging of
others. In the latter way a person is active as an agent in relation to
the world in which we are disciplined to learn by way of our
interaction with others about matters such as illness, property,
honour, etc. In this sphere of relations to the world a person may well
be envisaged as an active working subject but what obtains here
would be qualitatively different in the human person’s relation to
him- or herself. In the sphere of the relation to one’s self the
encounter is one of passivity for in confronting our own will desires
and senses “it is not possible for a man to direct his own life. He must
commend himself to God’s governance and rest.”44 So construed,
Luther himself is suggesting a limit on the sense in which a person is
essentially an acting, active and working subject.
What Jungel adds to this is not only contained in his presentation
of Luther’s distinction between person and work, “inner” and “outer,”
but in his view that there is a creative passivity modeled in the
activity of liturgical worship. Here, against the background of solo
verbo, sola fide Jungel aims to affirm human action grounded in
passivity without compromising the primacy of God’s determinative
action. He expounds Luther’s sacramental theology endorsing an
“exclusively Christological use of the term ‘sacrament’,” in which it
is “… understood and celebrated as God acting upon us, and is not
perverted into our handling of God in the form of a work of piety.”
Jungel then applies this to the notion to the Catholic view of
sacramental representation and the correlative description of Church
as a sacramental event which he believes need not be rejected but
clarified in terms of the “… character of that representation as
action.” Jungel does this by proposing what is called a soteriological
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distinction within the concept of action whereby he differentiates
between Creator, creation and the saving work of God by which he
means “… that every human action is characterized by a
fundamentally receptive action, by a creative passivity, that is, by
faith rather than by good works in which we seek to do something to
God in direct correspondence to his benefits. More simply: ‘to let
God perform his work – and this alone is the function of the church’s
action’.”45
Given Jungel’s view of the essential elements of liturgical
worship – a service to God which lets God perform his work – we
have a model of human action in worship which is a receiving. This
is an exercise of faith incapable of degenerating into acts of human
self-realization since the liturgical action of the church is the very
opposite of religious self-realization.46 In the receptive faith of
liturgy the Church asks, “What should we do?”, and the basic
response to God’s act of speaking his holy Word to us is that we in
turn speak to him in prayer and hymns of praise.47 Here, prayer and
praise are responsive actions or works with no causal or instrumental
uses nor any motivations and goals other than the sheer goodness of
the One praised. This is action in passivity and appears to be very
similar to that order of spontaneity that Luther has in mind when he
speaks of faith in the heart during the mass: “The heart must grow
warm and melt in the love of God. Then praise and thanksgiving will
follow with a pure heart …”48
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